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Firm Volatility and Credit: 
A Macroeconomic Analysis
Leo Kaas
This paper examines a tractable real business cycle model with idiosyncratic productivity shocks
and binding credit constraints on entrepreneurs. The model shows how firm volatility increases
in combination with credit market development. It further generates the observed comovement
of credit and firm volatility with output at business cycle frequencies in response to aggregate
productivity shocks. (JEL E32, E44, O16)
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changes in firm ownership, including merger and
acquisition activities.
This paper puts the link between financial
development and firm volatility in a macroeco-
nomic perspective. To this end, I develop a tract  -
able real business cycle model with idiosyncratic
productivity shocks and collateral-based borrow-
ing constraints. Productive entrepreneurs borrow
up to the value of their collateral. Because their
capital return exceeds the capital cost, the lever-
aged return on equity exceeds the equity return
of less-productive entrepreneurs. An increase in
credit market development relaxes borrowing
constraint and increases leverage, and thereby
also the spread between internal rates of return
across firms. As a result, firm growth rates become
more volatile.
Another implication of my model is that both
credit market development and firm volatility
respond positively to an aggregate productivity
shock. Higher productivity raises the value of
pledgeable assets, thus softening credit constraints
and leverage. Hence, both the volume of firm
credit and firm-level volatility are procyclical. In
the following section, I demonstrate that such
P
arallel to the decline in macroeconomic
volatility over the past decades (see
Blanchard and Simon, 2001, and Stock
and Watson, 2002), there is some evi-
dence that volatility at the firm level has increased
during the same period. For the United States,
such evidence is available for idiosyncratic stock
returns (Campbell et al., 2001), as well as for
employment, sales, and investment. Comin and
Mulani (2004) and Comin and Philippon (2005)
document similar results for other countries.1
There are different explanations for an increase
in firm volatility. One is that deregulation and
intensified global competition force firms to adjust
prices and business strategies faster. Another is
that financial development leads to more risk-
taking by entrepreneurs or facilitates leverage,
which both could potentially drive up firm volatil-
ity. Indeed, Comin and Philippon (2005) find some
support for both hypotheses. They also show that
the increase in firm volatility is driven neither by
the growing share of small firms in the sample nor
1 Davis et al. (2006) demonstrate, however, that firm-level employ-
ment volatility has increased only for publicly traded firms and
not for privately held firms.
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U.S. data. In the quantitative section, I match the
model to the U.S. business cycle and show that
it replicates reasonably well the comovements
among the three key variables of output, credit,
and firm volatility. However, the amplification
of firm volatility is twice as large as in the data,
and its cross-correlations with output and credit
are somewhat too low. The model can also be used
to investigate the effects of a financial crisis; in
particular, a severe crisis where collateral value
drops temporarily by 20 percent features a decline
of gross domestic product (GDP) below trend by
3.5 percent.
By adopting collateral-based borrowing con-
straints in combination with logarithmic utility
and Cobb-Douglas production technologies, my
model is essentially a variation of the approach
of Kiyotaki (1998) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2008),
who also develop tractable business cycle models
with binding credit constraints. Other theoretical
contributions on idiosyncratic production risk
and finance constraints in dynamic equilibrium
models are those of Hopenhayn and Vereshchagina
(2003) and Meh and Quadrini (2006). But while
they examine risk-taking in incomplete-market
environments, the effect of borrowing constraints
on firm leverage is the driving force of this paper.
Further, the model of this paper has closed-form
solutions, which make its basic mechanics par-
ticularly clear.
THE EVIDENCE
For the purpose of this paper, the appropriate
measure of credit market development is the share
of business credit in GDP, where “business credit”
includes all credit market debt owed by nonfinan-
cial firms, including corporations and noncor-
porations.2 Figure 1 illustrates the substantial
financial deepening during the period 1955 to
2000; as a share of GDP, business credit roughly
doubled. Real business credit actually increased
by a factor of 8.9.3
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Figure 1
Business Credit (Share of GDP) and Firm Volatility (Annual U.S. Data 1955-2000)
2 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2008).
3 Real business credit is defined as business credit divided by the
GDP deflator. Over the same horizon, by comparison, real house-
hold debt increased by a factor of 9.5, real government debt by a
factor of 4.9, and real credit market debt of the financial sector by
a factor of 99.5.Figure 1 also shows the increase in firm volatil-
ity during the same period. I use the “median sales
volatility” reported in Comin and Philippon (2005,
table 1) as a volatility measure. Specifically, Comin
and Philippon calculate a rolling standard devia-
tion (SD) of sales growth for nearly every firm in
the Compustat database; the median of the cross
section then measures firm volatility at every
point in time. It becomes evident from the figure
that firm volatility also doubled between 1955 and
2000. Of note, firm volatility is quite dispersed in
the cross section. For example, in the 1990s, sales
growth volatility was below 0.1 for 25 percent of
firms and above 0.3 for another 25 percent of firms
(see Figure 2 in Comin and Philippon, 2005).
Figure 1 further suggests that business credit
and firm volatility are positively correlated at the
business cycle frequency. To see this more clearly,
note that Figure 2 shows the detrended time series
of real business credit and of firm volatility, where
the trend is a Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter with 
ʻ = 100 and the cyclical components are reported
as log deviations from trend. Particularly since
the 1970s, the two cycles are closely synchronized
and the percentage deviations from trend are
similar in magnitude.
Table 1 summarizes the detrended data of
output, real business credit, and firm volatility.
Both firm volatility and credit have higher vari-
ance than output, and they are positively corre-
Kaas
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MARCH/APRIL 2009 97
Real Business Credit
Firm Volatility









Detrended Real Business Credit and Firm Volatility (Annual U.S. Data 1955-2000)
NOTE: Both variables are reported in logs as deviations from a Hodrick-Prescott trend with smoothing parameter 100.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics (Annual U.S. Data
1955-2000)
Output Credit Volatility
Standard deviation 0.021 0.042 0.050
Annual autocorrelation 0.546 0.826 0.675
Correlation matrix
Output 1 0.460 0.257
Credit —1 0.567
Volatility —— 1
NOTE: All variables are reported in logs as deviations from an
H-P trend with smoothing parameter 100.lated with contemporaneous output, where the
correlation between credit and output is stronger
than the one between volatility and output. The
correlation coefficient between credit and volatil-
ity increases from 0.567 to 0.775 when the period
is restricted to the years 1975 to 2000.
THE MODEL
Consider a one-sector growth model with infi-
nitely lived entrepreneurs and workers in which
either group is a continuum of mass one. All agents
derive logarithmic utility from consumption and
discount future utility with the factor β < 1. All
workers supply one unit of labor inelastically.
Entrepreneurs do not supply labor; they employ
workers and capital to produce output with a
Cobb-Douglas technology, which is subject to
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Specifically,
entrepreneur i in period t uses capital Kt
i and labor
Lt







the entrepreneur’s productivity attains the high
level At
i = At (productive state) with probability
π and the lower level At
i = B < A (unproductive
state) otherwise. These productivity realizations
are independent across time and across entrepre-
neurs. Thus, a fraction π of entrepreneurs is pro-
ductive in every period. The assumption that
productivity states are independent of history
simplifies the exposition but can easily be gener-
alized to allow for autocorrelated productivity
states. The only complication is that the model
must then be augmented by another state variable,
which is the share of wealth in the hands of pro-
ductive entrepreneurs.
Factor productivity at the technology frontier
At is subject to aggregate productivity shocks. In
particular, lnAt follows an AR(1) process with coef-
ficient ρ < 1, mean lnA –, and normally distributed
shocks with SD σ. The assumption that only the
frontier A fluctuates while the inferior technology
parameter B is fixed again simplifies the exposi-
tion and can be generalized. What is crucial for
the results, though, is that B fluctuates less than
proportionately with productivity at the frontier.
Output produced in period t becomes available
for entrepreneurs’ investment and consumption
purposes in the next period. To obtain closed-
form solutions, capital fully depreciates within
every period. Equivalently, Yt
i can be interpreted
to include both output and undepreciated capital.
In the calibration exercise, I use this interpreta-
tion and choose the capital share parameter α
accordingly.
Each period, all agents have access to a capital
market where they can borrow and lend at gross
interest rate Rt. Borrowing can be against collateral
only, however. Because labor income cannot be
collateralized, workers are not permitted to bor-
row. Further, I show that in any steady state with
constrained entrepreneurs, R < 1/β holds, which
implies that in any stochastic equilibrium near
the steady state, workers do not save; hence,
workers simply consume their wage income in
every period.
Entrepreneurs, in turn, can pledge a fraction
ʻ < 1 of their output, where the “collateral share”
parameter ʻplausibly depends both on technologi-
cal features (e.g., what part of capital is alienable)
and on the institutional framework and market
environment (e.g., creditors’ rights and availability
of credit market instruments). Every entrepreneur’s
principal and interest on debt Dt
i may not exceed
the value of collateral. That is, the credit constraint
takes the form RtDt
i ≤ ʻYt
i. Credit repayments
occur at the beginning of the next period before
realization of the next period’s productivity.
For any realization of technology shocks
￿At￿t ≥ 0, a competitive equilibrium is a list of





i) for every entrepreneur;
consumption plans and debt positions for workers
(Ct
w, Dt
w); and factor prices for labor and capital





i maximizes entrepreneur i’s
expected utility subject to budget and debt
constraints; that is, it solves
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4 In the initial period, t = 0, all debt positions are assumed zero, and
there is some given distribution of wealth across entrepreneurs.(ii) Ct
w, Dt
w maximizes workers’ expected utility
subject to budget and zero debt constraints;
that is; it solves
(iii) Markets for labor and capital clear:
The appendix characterizes the solutions to
the agents’ utility maximization problems. Par  -
ticu  larly in the neighborhood of a steady-state
equilibrium with binding constraints, workers
do not save; hence, Dt
w = 0 for all t ≥ 0. Further,
all entrepreneurs save a constant fraction β of
their wealth.
Before discussing an equilibrium with binding
debt constraints, it is instructive to see how the
economy acts when the collateral value ʻ is large
enough. In every period, then, all capital flows to
productive entrepreneurs who also hire the total
workforce. Because β is the entrepreneurs’ savings
rate and because total entrepreneur wealth is share
α of output, the aggregate capital stock evolves
according to Kt+1 = βαAtKt
α. The model’s dynamics
thus resemble those in the standard real business
cycle model with logarithmic utility, Cobb-Douglas
production, and full depreciation.
The following section characterizes equilib-
rium when productive entrepreneurs are credit
constrained and unproductive entrepreneurs do
not lend all their capital but also produce. Hence,
production is inefficient and the steady-state out-
max  ln         s.t. E C
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put level is below the one in the first-best econ-
omy. A parameter restriction explained below
will ensure that such an equilibrium exists.
EQUILIBRIUM
As is shown in the appendix, all entrepre-
neurs’ capital investments are linear in their
equity. Hence, aggregation over entrepreneurs
with identical technologies is straightforward,
and I write
to denote aggregate capital investment of produc-
tive and unproductive entrepreneurs. Lt
A and Lt
B
are similarly defined, and the absence of a super  -




s, s = A,B, denote capital
intensities for the two types of entrepreneurs.
Because labor moves freely between employ-
ers, the real wage is
which implies that
(1)        
Because labor is perfectly mobile and capital is
not, unproductive entrepreneurs operate their
technology with a higher capital intensity than
productive entrepreneurs. The labor and capital
markets are in equilibrium if
(2)                            
(3)                      
Let Dt denote total borrowing of productive entre-
preneurs, which equals total lending of unpro-
ductive entrepreneurs because workers do not
participate in the credit market. Because produc-
tive entrepreneurs own πKt units of the capital
stock, their capital input is the sum of equity and
debt:
(4)                       
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productive entrepreneur, it also holds with
equality in the aggregate:
(5)                     
Unproductive entrepreneurs are indifferent
between lending capital at gross return Rt or pro-
ducing themselves, which leads to the following
arbitrage condition:
(6)                        
From equations (1), (5), and (6), it follows that
borrowing is proportional to investment: 
(7)     
and substitution into equation (4) yields
(8)                         
To ensure that unproductive entrepreneurs
produce, their lending may not exceed their capital
holdings; that is, Dt must be strictly smaller than
￿1−π￿Kt. Together with equation (8), this necessi-
tates ʻ˕t < ￿1−π￿α. Because At fluctuates around
A –, ˕t fluctuates around ˕ – ￿￿ A –/B￿
1/α. To guarantee
a production-inefficient equilibrium in the neigh-
borhood of the steady state, it must therefore be
assumed that
(9)                         
The explanation of this condition is as follows.
If the collateral share were too large, productive
agents would borrow all resources from their
unproductive counterparts and production would
be efficient. The same would apply if either ˕ or
π were too large: With a large productivity spread,
production becomes less attractive than lending
for unproductive agents, and a large share of bor-
rowers raises credit above the funds supplied by
lenders. Similarly, a too-low capital share would
depress the interest rate, driving up the demand
for credit above lenders’ resources.
R B k t t
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Now equations (1), (2), (3), (4), and (7) can be
solved for the capital intensity of productive
entrepreneurs as follows:
where Ct < 1 follows from condition (9) when ˕t
is close to its steady-state value, so that Ct is close
to its steady-state level, C – < 1. This also implies
that kt
B = ˕tCtKt > Kt. Employment is allocated
according to
so aggregate output is
with total factor productivity AtCt
α < At. Because
workers earn share 1−α of output and do not save
and because all entrepreneurs save share β of
their wealth, the aggregate saving rate is αβ.
Hence, the capital stock evolves according to
In the absence of technology shocks, the capital
stock converges to its steady-state level:
Note that the steady-state interest rate is R – =
1/￿˕ –C –β￿ < 1/β; hence, workers indeed do not
save when entrepreneurs are credit constrained.
The steady-state credit share in output is
calculated as 
(10)                   
An unproductive entrepreneur’s capital grows
at rate βR –, whereas a productive entrepreneur’s
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firm’s growth rate in steady state is 
(11) 
The closed-form expressions (10) and (11)
capture the central message of this paper. On the
one hand, a rise in ʻ describes the effect of credit
market deepening in this model: When firms are
able to pledge more of their assets as collateral, the
share of credit in total output expands as shown
in expression (10). In tandem with the credit
expansion comes a higher firm volatility, as evi-
denced by equation (11). Relaxed credit limits spur
leverage, widening the gap between firm growth
rates, β￿R ˜ – R –￿. On the other hand, a positive
technology shock triggers a rise in credit and in
firm volatility. The increase of A (relative to B)
raises ˕, which unambiguously increases D/Y and
σ (which is again an implication of inequality (9)).
Intuitively, a positive productivity shock boosts
the value of collateral and thus the volume of
credit. Notably, credit rises more than one-for-one
with output, so the share of credit in output also
increases. Additionally, the positive technology
shock stimulates leverage, which enlarges the
spread between firm growth rates, increasing firm
volatility.
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
This section explores the quantitative proper-
ties of the qualitative results obtained in the pre-
vious section: How well does this model explain
the observed dynamics of output, business credit,
and firm volatility? To calibrate the steady state,
I first choose the following five parameters: the
capital share, α; the discount factor, β; the collat-
eral share, ʻ; the mean spread between technolo-
gies, ˕ –; and the share of productive entrepreneurs,
π. The technology level A – (and thus B) merely
shifts the level of aggregate output and capital
but has no impact on the capital-to-output ratio
˃ π π β
α ϕ
α λϕ απ απϕ




1  R R .
or on any other relevant economic variables.
Therefore, I normalize A – = 1.
Because there is no depreciation in this model,
I adjust the capital share to include the value of
the undepreciated capital stock. In the following,
the term “wealth” refers to GDP plus undepreci-
ated capital, Y = GDP + ￿1 − ʴ￿K. With an annual
capital-to-GDP ratio of K/GDP = 2.7 and a 5 per-
cent depreciation rate, the wealth-to-GDP ratio is
3.57. With capital income in GDP at one-third, it
follows that the capital share in wealth is α =
[0.33 + ￿0.95 . 2.7￿]/3.57 ≈ 0.81. Further, in steady
state, αβ= K/Y = 2.7/3.57, which yields β = 0.938.
I choose the collateral share, ʻ, to match a share
of business credit in GDP of around 0.55, the
average over the period 1955-2000. As equation
(10) gives the credit-to-wealth ratio, the right-
hand side of this equation must be equalized to
0.55/3.57. Given the above choices for α and β,
and for any choice of ˕ – and π, ʻis chosen to satisfy
this equation. The remaining parameters π and ˕ –
are chosen to match the following two targets: a
3 percent real interest rate (R – = 1.03) and a value
of firm volatility (measured by the SD of firm
growth) of around 0.14, the average of median firm
volatility during 1955-2000. This yields ˕ – = 1.13
and π = 0.08, which in turn implies that ʻ = 0.51.
At these parameter values, assumption (9) is satis-
fied by a wide enough margin. On the other hand,
if ʻ would exceed α￿1 − π￿/˕ – ≈ 0.66, assumption
(9) would be violated, in which case all capital
would be used at the technology frontier. Although
productive entrepreneurs may still be credit con-
strained,6 the model behaves like a standard real
business cycle model and the value of ʻ has no
effect on aggregate output.
In the stochastic model of this section, I do not
compute firm volatility defined over an infinite
time horizon—which, in steady state, gives rise
to equation (11) for every firm. Instead, I follow
the procedure of Comin and Philippon (2005) to
calculate rolling SDs of firm growth rates over
10-year time windows. Specifically, at each point
Kaas
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5 An entrepreneur with equity E borrows D = ʻ˕E/￿α – ʻ˕￿ and
invests K
A = αE/￿α – ʻ˕￿ to earn profit π = A￿k
A￿
α–1K









A = R ˜E.
6 Precisely, when ʻ < α￿1 − π￿ ≈ 0.75, the steady-state interest rate
stays below the marginal product of capital of productive entrepre-
neurs. Although the economy would be production efficient, it is
consumption inefficient because idiosyncratic volatility still matters.
First-best allocations are attained only when ʻ > α￿1 − π￿.in time t, I bootstrap the distribution of these SDs




τ = –4. Then I use the median of this
distribution as the volatility measure.
Figure 3 shows the model’s response to a
permanent increase in the collateral share ʻ by
about 5 percent. Output increases on impact by
1.3 percent, converging to the new steady state,
which is more than 2 percent higher. Credit
increases by about 23 percent, and volatility
increases by 15 percent. The response of volatility
is sluggish; also, the response begins four periods
before the shock because volatility is constructed
using rolling windows that are four periods back-
ward looking and five periods forward looking.
The largest adjustment of volatility occurs three
periods after the shock. The lower-right graph
shows the “capital misallocation,” defined as the
share of capital used by unproductive entrepre-
neurs. Note that only 8 percent of entrepreneurs
have access to the technology frontier, but they
still use 28 percent of capital when ʻ =0.51. As ʻ
increases to 0.535, 32 percent of capital is used
at the technology frontier.
Whereas this experiment shows the effect of
a permanent rise in collateral value, it also is illu-
minating to investigate the impact of a temporary
decline in collateral value as a result of a severe
financial crisis. To this end, suppose that the
collateral share drops by 20 percent for a period
of three years before it returns to its original value.
I find that the impact of such a shock is a decline
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Figure 3
Response to a 5 Percent Permanent Increase in the Collateral Share ʻ in Period t = 5of GDP by 3 to 3.5 percent in the three years of
the crisis, the largest occurring in the third year.
Because the model has little amplification, output
returns to 0.5 percent below its steady-state level
in the first year after the crisis. During the three
crisis years, credit collapses dramatically: It falls
by more than 40 percent, which implies that only
20 percent of capital is used at the frontier tech-
nology. Note again that these macroeconomic
effects of a decline of ʻ are due to the misalloca-
tion of capital; they would disappear if ʻexceeded
the threshold level implied by assumption (9).
Public policy may attempt to prevent the adverse
effects of the credit collapse to some extent, either
by restoring collateral value or by the injection of
liquidity—for example, by providing unsecured
credit lines. Without analyzing such policies for-
mally, it is clear that they must be of a large scale,
given the substantial decline of the credit market.
Figure 4 shows the impulse response to a
permanent increase of productivity at the technol-
ogy frontier by 1 percent. As the value of pledge-
able assets rises, credit expands by 6 percent, and
the higher leverage leads to an increase of firm
volatility by about 15 percent. Output increases
by 2 percent, which comes about through two
effects: The first is higher productivity at the tech-
nology frontier; the second is that capital is now
more efficiently allocated as capital misallocation
falls from 0.72 to 0.711.
To explore the stochastic model with auto-
correlated shocks,
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Figure 4
Response to a 1 Percent Permanent Increase in Productivity A in Period t = 5I choose the two parameters ρ and σ to target the
SD and autocorrelation of the cyclical compo-
nent of the model-generated GDP time series. As
explained previously, GDP in period t is the dif-
ference between Yt and the undepreciated capital
stock, which is 0.95 Kt = 0.95 αβYt−1. All time
series again are detrended with an H-P filter with
smoothing parameter 100, and the cyclical com-
ponents are the log deviations from trend. The
result of this exercise is that ρ= 0.95 and σ = 0.014
match the first two moments in Table 1 reason-
ably well. These and all other model-generated
moments from a simulation with 10
5 periods are
listed in Table 2. Relative to the data, the ampli-
fication of credit is matched reasonably well,
whereas the SD of firm volatility is more than
twice as large as in the data. Although all con-
temporaneous correlations have the right sign,
the one between output and credit is larger than
in the data, whereas the cross-correlations with
volatility are too low.
Volatility is strongly amplified because pro-
ductivity of the inferior technology stays constant.
If B were to fluctuate with A according to Bt/B – =
￿At/A –￿
ʳ, the SD of firm volatility would halve in
value for ʳ  = 0.5, and it would (counterfactually)
become smaller than the SD of output for ʳ  = 1.
Proper calibration of the stochastic dynamics of
both At and Bt would require matching the time-
ln ln , , , A A t t t t = + ( ) ˁ ˃ε ε –     1 01  1
series properties of the mean and the SD of the
cross-sectional productivity distribution, which
is beyond the scope of this paper.
CONCLUSION
This paper has developed a tractable real
business cycle model with idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shocks and collateral-based credit con-
straints. Important features of the model are that
output is below the efficient level because not all
capital is used at the technological frontier and
that firm growth rates are volatile. The model
allows derivation of closed-form expressions for
the dynamics of output and capital, for the vol-
ume of credit, and the SD of firm growth rates. It
accounts qualitatively for the observed simulta-
neous long-term increase of the credit-to-output
ratio and of firm volatility. Quantitatively, the
model is able to generate the correct comovement
among output, credit, and firm volatility, although
firm volatility is too strongly amplified.
REFERENCES
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Simon, John A. “The Long
and Large Decline in U.S. Output Volatility.”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, March
2001, 2001(1), pp. 135-64.
Campbell, John Y.; Lettau, Martin; Malkiel, Burton G.
and Xu, Yexiao. “Have Individual Stocks Become
More Volatile? An Empirical Exploration of
Idiosyncratic Risk.” Journal of Finance, February
2001, 56(1), pp. 1-43.
Comin, Diego and Mulani, Sunil. “Diverging Trends
in Macro and Micro Volatility: Facts.” NBER
Working Paper 10922, National Bureau of Economic
Research, November 2004; www.nber.org/papers/
w10922.
Comin, Diego and Philippon, Thomas. “The Rise in
Firm-Level Volatility: Causes and Consequences.”
NBER Working Paper 11388. National Bureau of
Economic Research, May 2005; www.nber.org/
papers/w11388.
Kaas
104 MARCH/APRIL 2009 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
Table 2
Simulation Results with Stochastic
Productivity for 10,000 Model Periods
Output Credit Volatility
Standard deviation 0.022 0.061 0.130
Annual autocorrelation 0.534 0.542 0.643
Correlation matrix
Output 1 0.980 0.177
Credit —1 0.183
Volatility —— 1
NOTE: All variables are reported in logs as deviations from an
H-P trend with smoothing parameter 100.Davis, Steven, J.; Haltiwanger, John; Jarmin, Ron and
Miranda, Javier. “Volatility and Dispersion in
Business Growth Rates: Publicly Traded versus
Privately Held Firms.” NBER Working Paper 12354,
National Bureau of Economic Research; June 2006;
www.nber.org/papers/w12354.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Z.1. Flow of
Funds Accounts of the United States: Flows and
Outstandings Third Quarter 2008. Credit Market
Debt Outstanding (December 11, 2008).
Washington, DC: Board of Governors, 2008;
www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/
09s1130.xls.
Hopenhayn, Hugo A. and Vereshchagina, Galina.
“Risk Taking by Entrepreneurs.” Rochester Center
for Economic Research Working Paper 500,
University of Rochester, April 2003;
http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/
rcer_500.pdf.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro. “Credit and Business Cycles.”
Japanese Economic Review, March 1998, 49(1), 
pp. 18–35.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and Moore, John. “Liquidity,
Business Cycles, and Monetary Policy.” Working
Paper, Princeton University, April 2008;
www.princeton.edu/~kiyotaki/papers/ChiKM6-1.pdf.
Meh, Cesaire A. and Quadrini, Vincenzo. “Endogenous
Market Incompleteness with Investment Risks.”
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
November 2006, 30(11), pp. 2143-65.
Stock, James H. and Watson, Mark W. “Has the
Business Cycle Changed and Why?” NBER Working
Paper 9127, National Bureau of Economic Research,
August 2002; www.nber.org/papers/w9127.
Kaas
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MARCH/APRIL 2009 105
APPENDIX
This appendix characterizes the solutions to the workers’ and entrepreneurs’ utility maximization
problems. Consider entrepreneurs first, and suppose that productive entrepreneurs are debt constrained,
which requires that
(A1)                                                           
for all t ≥ 0. All entrepreneurs hire labor to equalize marginal product to the wage; hence,
Consider first productive entrepreneurs ￿At
i = At￿. They borrow up to their debt limit because the mar-




i denote equity (savings) of the entrepreneur. Wealth at the end of period t is proportional
to the borrower’s capital investment and also proportional to equity:
R A w t t t < − ( )    
− ( )
α α
α α α 1 1
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Here R ˜
t is the return on equity for an entrepreneur who is productive in period t. Consequently, the




t+1 = R ˜
tSt
i. Consider next an unproductive entrepreneur
in period t; that is, At
i = B. There are two possibilities. First, either the interest rate exceeds the marginal
product of capital of these entrepreneurs—in which case they do not produce and their return on
savings is simply Rt—or, as is assumed in the main text, the interest rate equals their marginal product




i is savings and –Dt
i > 0 are financial assets of unproductive entrepreneur i. Wealth
at the end of period t is again proportional to savings:








if the entrepreneur is unproductive in period t and Rt
i = R ˜
t if the entrepreneur is productive in t. The
Euler equation for entrepreneur i’s utility maximization problem is then
Clearly, constant consumption/saving shares C
i






i are the only solution
to this equation that satisfy the transversality condition.
For workers, the Euler equations for their problem specified in (ii) of the equilibrium definition is
with complementary slackness. In the main text, it is shown that Rtβ < 1 holds in the neighborhood of
the steady state. Further, in the neighborhood of the steady state (i.e., small-enough productivity shocks),
wt ≈ w – and Et￿1/wt+1￿ ≈ 1/w – hold, where w – is the steady-state wage level. Therefore, it follows from the
complementary slackness condition that Dt
w = 0 and Ct
w = wt for all t ≥ 0.











( ) ( ) − −











   
=
− ( )





















R B w t t = − ( )    
− ( )
α α
α α α 1 1
1 .











i ( ) ( ) − − = ( ) ( )
− − α α α
α
1 1 α α
−
= − ( ) =
R D

































7 The third case—that the interest rate is below the marginal product of capital of all entrepreneurs—is incompatible with equilibrium; then
all entrepreneurs would be lenders, whereas workers do not save (as shown below). Hence, the capital market cannot be in equilibrium.